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The Vote Production Function (VPF) has a party’s vote depending on (a) its potential 
vote and (b) the party organization which actualizes it – ‘political capital.’ Empirical 
work suggests that moving to the centre would increase your vote if only you could hold 
political capital constant. The relative weights of the factors in the VPF will determine 
whether parties converge or polarize ideologically and politicians’ rent seeking behavior. 
In most cases, the more important political capital is, the greater the extent of rent 
seeking. There is thus a welfare case for sidelining party organizations. Compulsory 
voting might help. 
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The Production Function for Votes 
 
If political parties aim to win elections why don’t they converge in the ideological centre, 
as location theory would suggest? One reason is that their ‘core’ voters, i.e. those a long 
way from the centre, are especially valuable to them. They furnish the bulk of the 
enthusiasts and activists, so much so that, if you lose them, you can’t take proper 
advantage of your new, middle-of-the-road, supporters. Envelopes remain unaddressed 
and no one is offering lifts to the poll. Party membership falls and with it party income. 
 
A party’s vote can thus be seen as the outcome of a production function, where potential 
voters (l) are one factor and ‘political capital’ (k) – activists and money – the other. 
       
α α − =
1 l k v  
The function has two main properties. First, whether or not voters turn out depends on the 
political capital of the parties. (In the standard Downsian model, potential voters are 
actual voters – and only ideological location matters.) Martin P. Wattenberg (2002) 
writes, “Political Parties organize for campaigns just like generals organize for battle. 
Commanders raise an army for their campaigns; the functional equivalent for parties is its 
mass membership. Parties have traditionally relied upon their members to stand on the 
political front line, carrying their message out to the electorate at large. Party members 
put up signs and pass out leaflets during the campaign. On Election Day, they work the 
phone banks and knock on doors to get out the vote. Taken together, these membership 
activities undoubtedly serve to stimulate turnout.” Second, ideology drives voting   2
through more than one channel. A party that moves to the centre may gain territory from 
its opponents but possibly at the cost of membership or income or both. For this reason 
parties don’t necessarily converge in the middle. 
 
Section 1 of the paper looks at the vote production function (hereafter VPF) in more 
detail and examines some empirical evidence. A feature of the VPF is that the bivariate 
relationship between actual votes and ideological territory is ambiguous, but when 
membership and campaign expenditure are controlled for there should be a clear link and 
the data support these hypotheses. In Section 2 we see how the VPF implies two possible 
ideological equilibria within a standard model of political competition. Section 3 
considers the implications of the VPF for the quality of government by affecting the 
incentive for politicians seek rents. We find that the quality of government depends on 
the relative importance of political capital and potential voters and that a smaller role for 
capital may be desirable. Compulsory voting, which must reduce the importance of the 
party machine in delivering the vote, is a case in point. 
 
I. The Vote Production Function 
 
In our vote production function (
α α − =
1 l k v ), α  gives the relative weights of potential 
voters and political capital. This is a generalization of a standard Downsian model in 
which potential voters are actual voters and only policy location matters. (In the 
Downsian model α is equal to zero and parties compete for territory such that in 
equilibrium both parties’ policy platforms coincide with the ideal of the median voter.)   3
The VPF has diminishing marginal returns to capital and to potential voters and constant 
returns to scale. The Cobb-Douglas form proposed here does of course imply strong (and 
testable) assumptions but we follow precedent and defend the function on grounds of 
simplicity. 
 
Suppose there are two parties, X and Y. Let a random variable 
* d , uniformly distributed 
between  2 d −  and  2 d + , reflect exogenous factors affecting the popularity of the two 
parties. Without loss of generality assume  () ( ) X d Y d
* * − =  so that a positive shock for 
party X is also a negative shock, of equal magnitude, for Y, and only one shock term is 
required. For each party let  S d L l K k
* 1+ = = , where S is share of the vote, and 
upper-case letters denote the values of all variables when  0
* = d  with lower-case letters 
denoting post-shock realizations. Thus when a party experiences a positive (negative) 
shock, it gains (loses) both potential voters and political capital equiproportionately. 
 
Therefore, actual votes can be expressed as a function of actual political capital, ex ante 
(i.e. pre-shock) potential voters and the shock term: 
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Our empirical work proxies actual political capital with membership and campaign 
expenditure. Because we have actual data on these variables discussion of the 
determination of political capital itself is deferred until later. Potential voters, however, 
are not directly observable and we must discuss their determination now. 
   4
Suppose the ideological scale runs from 0 (left) to 1 (right). Let y and x be the ideological 
positions chosen by the two parties. Assume that  x y <  i.e. party Y is left of party X. Now 
suppose the electorate are uniformly distributed across the ideological spectrum with the 
size of the electorate normalized to 1. The uniform distribution is common to the 
literature (see for example Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (2000), chapter 3) and 
captures the concept of an ideologically diverse electorate. When  0
* = d , each elector is 
a potential voter for the party to which she is closest ideologically. Thus voters whose θ 
(ideological score) is less than (greater than) () 2 y x +  will vote, if they vote at all, for 
party Y (party X.) Figure 1 depicts potential voters. 
 
Given the uniform distribution,  () ( ) 2 y x Y L + = . The actual number of potential voters 











































1 ) ( . The log difference in actual votes, or ‘majority’ of the left 
wing party over the right wing party is therefore 
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Equation (1) is the basis for our empirical work. We focus on relative vote share to avoid 
problems associated with changing electorates and turnout. The dependent variable is the 
actual relative vote of the left and this depends on two observable arguments as well as 
the residual. The first of these is the relative political capital of the left, as captured by the 
first term on the right hand side, which we proxy with members and campaign   5
expenditure. The second term captures the conventional median voter location argument 
as depicted in Figure 1. For example an increase in y represents a move to the centre by 
the left-wing party, which adds to its own territory by invading that of the right-wing 
party. The final term is a residual term, which theoretically has expectation zero. 
 
To examine the relationship between votes cast, ideology and our measures of political 
capital we use general election data for 15 OECD democracies. The general election 
results data come from Keesing’s Contemporary archives. There is a substantial political 
science literature concerned with the construction of quantitative ideology data and we 
use the preferred measures of Matthew J. Gabel and John D. Huber (2000) covering 
elections from 1950-1992. The membership data of Susan Scarrow (2000) are the most 
comprehensive available with 116 observations across different countries between 1960 
and 1992. Party finance data on campaign expenditure comes from Richard S. Katz and 
Peter Mair (1992) and unfortunately is quite patchy; there are only 41 observations 
covering 7 countries (one of which is Ireland – for which there is only one observation) 
for which both membership and campaign expenditure data are available. The data set is 
described in more detail in the Data Appendix. 
 
It is instructive to contrast the VPF with a conventional median voter model where 
potential voters are actual voters and membership/political capital is irrelevant. The 
conventional model predicts that in equilibrium the political parties will be ideologically 
indistinguishable. Figure 2 plots the time series of ideology data for the two main parties 
in the UK and France, and shows a persistent ideological gap in both cases. Similar   6
findings hold in other countries. This gap suggests that there is some centrifugal force 
opposing the centralizing pull in the median voter theorem. Our interpretation is that this 
force is political capital. 
 
The conventional median voter model predicts that the greater the political territory 
occupied by the left-wing party the greater its majority, regardless of the impact of 
political capital. Figure 3 plots the left-wing majority against our location variable. 
Consistent with the simple median voter model there is a positive slope, but the fit is not 
good. There is at best a very weak bivariate relationship between the majority of the left-
wing and ideology, as captured by the relative political territory occupied by left-wing 
parties. However, the VPF (1) suggests that once political capital is controlled for, then a 
systematic relationship between votes and ideology should emerge. 
 
The data essentially consist of an uneven pool of general elections in 15 countries spread 
over about 40 years. Political systems and voting behavior differ considerably across the 
countries, and any inference made must be treated with caution. However, it is only 
between general elections that ideology varies meaningfully and so pooling is the only 
way to get anything like a reasonable sample with which to conduct regression analysis. 
To control partially for country specific effects we include fixed effects and country 
specific heterogeneous time trends as explanatory variables.
1 Heteroscedasticity is a 
potential problem as the vote share Si, will be correlated with the explanatory variables, 
and also determines the effect on votes of the shock term 
* d . Another possible source of 
heteroscedasticity is any country specific noise not captured by the simple VPF. Breusch-  7
Pagan tests on the squared residual were conducted for all the explanatory variables and 
on country dummies and in most cases heteroscedasticity could be rejected, but where it 
pertained to specific countries these were omitted from the pool. Having eliminated 
country specific heteroscedasticity, we used the White correction to deal with any 
remaining heteroscedasticity. 
 
Initially we measure political capital purely by party membership. Estimation of equation 
(1) using the dataset detailed in the appendix gives the results in Table 1. Here ideology 
is significant with the correct sign. This is evidence that ideology does determine voting 
behavior, once membership has been controlled for. Membership is also correctly signed 
and highly significant. The sizes of the residuals for Canada and Ireland were found to be 
significantly different from the other countries and so these were omitted from 
estimation.
2 The Ramsey RESET test does not indicate any misspecification, providing 
some support for the Cobb-Douglas function form. Membership and relative ideological 
location explain 41% of the total variation in the left-wing majority in this sample. These 
are encouraging results for the model and represent an improvement over the standard 
median voter model in Figure 2. 
 
Interestingly, the hypothesis that the parameters sum to one is firmly rejected. This could 
signify decreasing returns to scale. A possible explanation of this is that members are 
heterogeneous in their effectiveness – core personnel and committee members who have 
invested decades of membership and have a stronger commitment may put more hours 
into banging on doors than lukewarm recent converts. Thus over and above diminishing   8
marginal returns (which relate to a homogenous input) the quality of the input may 
decline as it increases. Alternatively, measurement error in the explanatory variables 
would bias the parameter estimates downwards, and there is much evidence that parties 
exaggerate their membership to give favorable impressions of their strength (Scarrow, 
2000). Re-estimating the voting equation using an errors-in-variables regression model 
for decreasing degrees of reliability in the membership data certainly increases the 
coefficient estimates. There is no way of knowing exactly how badly mis-measured the 
membership data may be, but political scientists agree that the mismeasurement may be 
considerable. Assuming, for example, a 30% reliability coefficient (i.e. attributing 70% of 
the total variation in the explanatory variable to measurement error) makes the errors-in-
variable regression model yield the results in Table 2 where both parameters are correctly 
signed and highly significant. As expected, accounting for measurement error increases 
the sensitivity of voting to true membership numbers. Furthermore the constant-returns 
restriction is now not rejected. However the results are quite sensitive to the degree of 
reliability placed in the membership data. Those reported assume a large degree of this 
type of error, and give a flavor of the consequences of mismeasurement. 
 
Another possibility is that membership by itself does not fully capture political capital. 
We now re-estimate equation (1), but with political capital represented as a weighted 
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where the second of these equations exhibits ‘constant returns’ as implied by the vote 
production function. The parameter λ weights the membership and campaign expenditure 
components of political capital. 
 
The more general regression, reported in Table 3, unfortunately uses a smaller data set 
due to limited financial data but nonetheless generates interesting results. In the 
unrestricted regression all the parameter estimates exhibit the correct sign, and the model 
restriction is passed and so the restricted model is preferred. In this regression ideology is 
highly significant with the correct sign so again we find that ideology does determine 
voting behavior, once membership and finances have been controlled for. The 
membership and finance parameters are significant and correctly signed, and the 
estimated value of λ (0.283) suggests that finance counts for more than membership in 
winning elections, so that regressions using membership only will suffer from omitted 
variable bias. The null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected at the 5% 
level, although the RESET test does in this case indicate some misspecification. The true 
vote generation process is undoubtedly more complex than that implied by the vote 
production function, but, given the diversity of the countries and their electoral systems, 
it is a considerable result that 68% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained 
by the explanatory variables. Finally, the parameter magnitudes are similar to those in the 
errors-in-variables regression results in Table 2 and both types of estimation put the value 
of α at around 2/3. 10% more political capital will bring in about twice as many actual 
votes as 10% more potential voters would. How far this is a reason to avoid the centre   10
will depend on how political capital itself is related to ideology, a question we take up in 
the next section. 
 
II. Political Competition 
 
In this section we look at the decisions parties face within a standard model of political 
competition but subject to the VPF. In particular we show how ideological stance is 
determined.  
 
A.  Objectives 
 
Suppose party Y is currently in power, and is trying to maximize a weighted combination 
of its rents from being in power and the probability of being re-elected. It can increase its 
vote by giving up rents and spending the money on public goods (or giving it back as tax 
cuts, which, for simplicity, we will treat as a perfect substitute for public spending in the 
eyes of the voters.) As in Persson and Tabellini (2000) the government itself therefore 
opportunistically seeks rents (dislikes spending money on public goods) but this is 
mitigated by the desire to win office. 
 
Hence the party Y’s utility function is written as 
)) 5 . 0 ) ( ( ( ) ( ) ( > + − = Y s prob g R b Y U  
where R is maximum possible rent, g is government spending,  () Y s  is Y’s share of the 
vote, and b the weight it puts on rents rather than votes.
3 Any money not spent on public   11
goods is therefore kept as rent. An alternative interpretation of g is that the provision of 
public goods eats into government rents by requiring effort (a ‘bad’) to ensure tax 
receipts are not wasted. 
 
On our existing assumptions that  () ( ) X d Y d
* * − = , and that () () S d L l K k
* 1+ = = , 
and recalling that upper case letter denote values when the shock term is zero, then from 
equation (1), 
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*  (the 
sum of both parties’ votes that would pertain given a zero shock). This is the result of the 
way we constructed the shock term: gains for one party are mirrored by losses for the 
other, so that the actual votes cast are equal to the total that would occur were there no 
shock. 
 
Dividing (2) through by  v Σ  (or  V ∑ ), the result for both parties is that 
* d S s + = . Given 
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So, until the shock 
* d  is realized, party Y’s probability of winning an election depends on 
the vote share it would win in a shock-less world ( () Y S ) and the density of the popularity   12
shock variable (d).  () Y S  itself depends on its potential voter base and its political capital, 
both of which, as we will shortly discuss, depend on the party’s policy platform. Thus 
parties (which will alternate in government as 
* d  fluctuates) have to choose ideological 
position, which trades off potential voters against political capital, and public spending, 
which trades off rents against election chances. 
 
B.  Potential Voters 
 
In Section 1 and Figure 1 we specified how potential voters respond to the ideological 
choices made by Y and X. Now let party Y spend (i.e. not extort as rent) g and party X 
spend 
X g ; and let the effect of public spending g  (
X g ) be to increase (lower) the 
number of potential Y voters by  () g f  ( ( )
X g f ). So parties can increase their territory 
beyond the critical point 
2
y x +
 in Figure 1 by improving their performance and 
increasing  g. We assume that  () g f  and  ( )
X g f  are of identical form; that 
) ( ' ' 0 ) ( ' g f g f > > ; and that voters compare the incumbent party’s spending with that of 
the opposition party last time that it was in power. For example if both parties spend the 
same g (and there is no shock) then the critical point in Figure 1 remains at 
2
y x +
. If the 
left-wing party spends more then the critical point is to the right of this point, and if the 
right-wing party spends more then the critical point moves to the left. Hence 
() ( ) () ( )
X g f g f y x Y L − + + = 2  
and   13
(4)      () 5 . 0 = y Y L  and  ) ( ' ) ( g f Y L g = . 
 
C. Political Capital 
 
Given the unanimity of political scientists (see e.g. Patrick Seyd et al, 1996) on the 
subject, we assume that party activists and donors are more skewed toward the political 
extremes than the electorate as a whole. In what follows we assume that political capital 
is spread across the ideological spectrum with a distribution 
| ) 5 . 0 ( | ) (
θ θ
− =
c Ae K  where 
0 ≥ c , the size of c determining how skewed towards the extremes. (In the limiting case 
of  0 = c  political capital, like potential voters, is distributed uniformly). 
 
Thus there is a stock of political capital part of which parties can obtain through choosing 
their policy platforms. It is this that drags parties away from the ideological middle 
ground. We assume that activists and contributors help a party if they like it enough (i.e. 
if the psychic gains of helping it exceed the trouble.) A natural assumption is that, in the 
absence of public spending, the psychic gains of helping a party are inverse to your 
ideological distance from it, but the cost (time, money and effort) is constant. Let z be the 
critical ideological distance. So donors and activists supply political capital if they are 
within this distance of one party and not the other. Political capital that is within this 
distance of both parties goes to whichever is closer. Thus party Y’s range of political 
capital will be between  () z y − , 0 max  and  () () z y y x + + , 2 min . Figure 4 illustrates the 
case where the limits are () z y z y + − ,.  P a r t y  Y increases its political capital by moving 
away from the centre.   14
We now assume that activists and donors, like potential voters, are susceptible to efficient 
government. To incorporate this idea we assume that spending g by party Y will widen its 
range of capital by  ) (g β  at the leftward end, while at its rightward end it picks up capital 
that is no more than [ () ( )
X g g β β − ] further away from it than it is from X. (Spending 
X g  by party X has analogous effects.) Y’s range of activists will thus be between 
() () g z y β − − , 0 max  and  () ( ) [ ] () ( ) [ ] ( )
X X g g z y g g y x β β β β − + + − + + 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 min .  In 
what follows we assume that  ) (g β  and  ) (
X g β are identical in form and that 
β'(g) >0 > β"(g). 
 
D. Some Observations 
 
[1] Since  () g f  and  ( )
X g f  have identical forms, as do ) (g β  and  ) (
X g β , and the 
distributions of both potential voters and political capital are symmetrical between left 
and right, it follows that the two parties’ incentives, as they choose public spending and 
ideological distance from the centre, are identical. So in any Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
the parties’ positions are symmetrical in the sense that they are equidistant from the 
middle ground, and extort rents to the same extent as each other, i.e.  1 = + y x  and 
X g g = . Hence  5 . 0 )) ( ) ( ( 5 . 0 = − + +
X g g y x β β  and y + z + β(g)− β(g
X) = y + z 
 
[2] We can be sure that  z y ≥ + ) (g β ;  y −z −β(g) <0 would mean the party’s left flank 
would be truncated at zero and it would always pay it to move towards the centre. (A 
move to the centre would gain both potential voters and centre-ground political capital   15
without losing any of the ideologically-extreme capital.) Hence 
) ( )) ( , 0 max( g z y g z y β β − − = − − . 
 
[3] The combined effect of observations [1] and [2] is to restrict Y’s range of capital to 
(y −z −β(g),min[y +z,0.5]. But we now also assume that  25 . 0 > z . (Effectively, we 
have ruled out the case where a party is simultaneously too moderate for some potential 
activists and too extreme for others: allowing this possibility greatly complicates the 
mathematics without yielding any additional insight.) If z>0.25, it follows that 
y +z > y −z +0.5≥ y − z−β(g)+0.5≥ 0.5. Hence  [] 5 . 0 5 . 0 , min = + z y .  Y’s range of 
capital is thus  () () 5 . 0 , g z y β − − . 
 
So the centre ground political capital is always working for the party, and the critical 
marginal capital is located at the extreme of the party’s range. Political capital (before 
shocks) can therefore be written as the integral of the density function between these two 
limits: 
(5)     () 1 ) ( ) (
)) ( 5 . 0 ( 5 . 0
) ( − = =
+ + −
− − ∫
g z y c
g z y e
c
A
d K Y K
β
β θ θ  
The comparative statics (i.e how political capital responds to changes in ideological 
stance) can now be considered. Suppose y increases by dy. Y’s activists will now be in the 
range ( () dy g z dy y 5 . 0 5 . 0 , + − − + β ) i.e. 
) | ) ( ( ) | ) ( ( 5 . 0 ) ( ) ( 5 . 0 g z y y K K Y K β θ θ θ θ − − = = − =  
The first term in this expression represents centre ground political capital, captured from 
the other party, while the second represents capital on the fringe which stops work   16
altogether as the party deserts it. Given it is relative political capital that is important in 
determining the vote share we can write the sum of Y’s gain and X’s loss as: 
(6)   ( ) ) ( 1 ) | ) ( ( ) | ) ( ( ) ( ) (
)) ( 5 . 0 (
) ( 5 . 0 Y cK e A K K X K Y K
g z y c
g z y y y − = − = − = −
+ + −
− − = =
β
β θ θ θ θ  
Equation (6) gives a useful and simple result: when the left-wing party marginally shifts 
to the centre, its relative political capital falls proportionately to its existing stock. Thus 
even though the centrist shift increases capital in the centre, and also eats into the 
opposition’s capital, the net effect on relative political capital is still negative due to the 
larger loss on the party’s extremist wing. 
 
E. Ideological Equilibrium 
 
Now consider how the parties choose their ideological position so as to maximize their 
objective in equation (3). Differentiating this with respect to y yields 
) ( 4
) ( ) (
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The last equality follows from the fact we are considering a Nash equilibrium where pre-
shock votes are equal and  () ( ) X V Y V = . Substituting in 
α α − =
1 L K V , plus the facts that 
in equilibrium  () ( ) 5 . 0 = = X L Y L  and  () ( ) 0 ≡ + y y X L Y L , gives 
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If, therefore, α is less than this critical value (call it 
* α ), it will always pay Y (and X) to 
move nearer the centre, and the two parties will converge at  5 . 0 = = y x . If 
* α α > , it 
will always pay Y to move away from the centre. However it will not end up at  0 = y , but 
rather at  () g z y β + = , the point at which, as we have discussed, any further leftward 
move results in an unambiguous loss of votes.
4 X, by similar reasoning will end up at 
( )
X g z x β − − =1 . 
 
So, as capital becomes less important in delivering the vote (i.e. as α falls), parties move 
to the centre. This always picks up potential votes, but now does so at a reduced cost in 
terms of political capital. If the stock of capital is very skewed towards the political 
extremes (high c), the move to the centre as α falls will be delayed, but there will always 
be some α low enough to precipitate it. By contrast, if  0 = c  , parties converge at all 
positive  α. This is straightforward. If  0 = c , activists have the same rectangular 
distribution as voters. It follows that, each time party Y inches towards the centre it loses 
two left-wing activists and gains one centrist one from party X. Both parties are therefore 
down one activist, and party Y has nothing to lose by moving towards the centre. Since it 
will also be gaining potential voters by doing so, it will move to the centre. The value of 
α is beside the point. (If, contrary to our assumption, c were actually negative, this would 
all be true a fortiori.) 
   18
But, unless  0 ≤ c , we have discontinuity. Parties are either at the centre, with  5 . 0 = = x y  
or polarized to the point that their leftmost (rightmost) activist is the leftmost (rightmost) 
person in the country, the point where  () g z y β + = . We will call these alternatives the 
‘median voter’ outcome and the ‘polarity’ outcome. Our estimate that  3 2 = α  for a 
typical OECD country, together with the fact that the two main parties do not converge in 
the ideological centre, implies that c must be at least unity. In other words political 
capital is sufficiently skewed towards the extremes of the ideological spectrum that it 
grows, as the centre is vacated, at a more-than-unitary exponential rate. 
 
III. The Quality of Government 
 
So far we have seen the two parties choosing ideological locations. Whether they 
converge on the centre, or locate themselves so as to maximize political capital, depends 
on the value of α  in the VPF. In this section we consider the implications of the VPF for 
the choice of public spending, g. Recall that what is not spent on public good is rents 
extracted from the electorate. Social welfare therefore depends on g, and it turns out that 
g itself depends crucially on the vote production function parameter α.  
 
A. How social welfare depends on the weighting of the vote production function 
 
From (3), public spending will be at the point where 
(8)      0
) (
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By analogy with (7) 
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which, combined with (4) and (8), gives: 
(10)   () () g g g X K Y K
Y K
bd
Y L g f ) ( ) (
) ( 1 4 1









This first order condition clearly depends on how relative political capital responds to 
better government ( ) g g X K Y K ) ( ) ( − . But the size of K(Y)g itself depends on whether 
( () g z y β − − ), the left frontier of activism, is zero or greater than zero. 
 
Case 1: The Median Voter Outcome (α <α*,  5 . 0 = y ) 
 
Here a rise in g will, on our above assumptions, rake in activists at both Y’s fringes, 
widening their range by  () g ' β on the left and  () g ' 5 . 0 β  in the centre, the latter group also 
being lost to X. Thus the sum of Y’s gain and X’s loss can be written as: 
(11)  () () [ ]
)) ( (
5 . 0 5 . 0 1 ) ( ' | | ) ( ' ) ( ) (
g z c
g z g g e A g K K g X K Y K
β
β θ θ β β
+
− − = = + = + = −  
Substituting (11) into the first order condition (10), and using (5), (which gives the result 
that when  5 . 0 = y ,  () () () () 1 − =




β ), we have: 







































Our objective is to see how public spending, g, responds to changes in the relative 
importance of the two arguments in the VPF, i.e. to the parameter α. The condition for 
() () 0 ' < α g f , and hence (given  () 0 ' ' < g f ) the condition for  0 > α g , is   20


























Let us call the expression
5 on the RHS of (13) 
* ' β . Therefore, when 
* ' ) ( ' β β > g , 
0 > α g , i.e. any increase in α  is good for welfare, so that the optimum within the range 
is its top end, 
* α α = . If  ()
* ' ' β β < g , then political capital is not sufficiently sensitive to 
good government. The ideal is  0 = α , i.e. we would like potential voters to have 
maximum say in the formation of government.
6  
 
The intuition here is that the incentive to govern better (raise g) depends on how many 
extra votes this would bring in. The more freely the supply of a factor (k or l) responds to 
better government, the more the standard of government will itself respond to that factor 
carrying more weight in the VPF. If the supply of, say, political capital is sensitive to g 
and the vote is sensitive to the supply of political capital, the electoral payoff from giving 
up rents is high and parties will act accordingly. 
 
Case 2:The Polarity Outcome (α >α*,  () g z y β + = ) 
 
If  () 0 = − − g z y β , there is no more capital on the leftward fringe to rake in if g rises any 
more. (i.e. the most left-wing person in the country is already working for party Y.) 
Consequently Y gains no activists at  () g z y β − −  by improving its behavior and 
(14)     A g K g X K Y K g g ) ( ' ) | )( ( ' ) ( ) ( 5 . 0 β β θ = = − = .   21
Substituting (14) into (10), and using (5), which gives the result that when  () g z y ' β + = , 
) 1 ( ) (




Y K , we have 























Thus the condition for () 0 ) ( ' < α g f , and hence  0 > α g , is
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Call the expression on the RHS of (16) 
* * ' β .  As in the median voter case (13), an 
exogenous fall in  () g ' β  makes  α g  more likely to be negative.
8 We have already seen the 
essential intuition. Low  () g ' β  means there is little mileage to be got from trying to please 
activists and donors; it is thus potential voters’ opinions which will be more effective in 
stopping governments from taking too many rents. We therefore want the power of 
potential voters to be enhanced still more by lower α. Think of the activists and potential 
voters as two vigilantes, both trying to enforce good government. If you have two 
vigilantes and two sticks, you get maximum enforcement when the bigger vigilante gets 
the bigger stick. So when  () g ' β  is low (high), low (high) α will raise g. 
 
Two further propositions follow from (13) and (16): 
 
PROPOSITION 1. g undergoes a downward jump as  α  rises through
* α . Proof: g is 
always set such that  () bd Y S g =  (equation (8)). Comparison of (11) and (14) in the light 
of (9) shows that as α crosses 
* α  from below,  () g Y S  falls discontinuously. Therefore the   22
government will alter g until  () g Y S  rises back to bd . Since  () 0 < gg Y S , the change in g 
must be downwards. 
 
The logic behind this proposition is that as α crosses 
* α  from below, the parties diverge 
from the centre. Now higher g will no longer pull in activists from the ideological fringe 
as they will be working for party Y anyway. The incentive to spend falls and so does 
spending. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. It is possible for  α g  to be positive in α’s lower range and negative in 
its upper, but not vice versa. Proof: Since  − + = = < * * | |
α α α α g g  (Proposition 1), 
() () − + = = > * * | |
α α α α g f g f . Since  
() [] () [] () ( ) ( ) { } − + − + = = = = − = − * * * * | | 1 | |
α α α α α α α α α α α g f g f g f g f , it now follows that 
() [] () [] − + = = > * * | |
α α α α α α g f g f  and hence  − + = = < * * | |
α α α α α α g g , i.e.  α g  as well as g 
jumps downwards at 
* α . Given that 
* α  is the only value of α  at which  α g  can change 
sign (notes 6 and 7) it follows that  0 < α g at 
* α α <  necessarily implies  0 < α g  at 
* α α >  but not vice versa. 
 
The logic this time is as follows:  α g  is positive when political capital is good at inducing 
better government, i.e. when its allegiance is sensitive to the quality of government. It 
will always be more sensitive in the ‘median voter’ case because here higher g brings in   23
capital from both wings of the party, not just the ‘moderate’ one. Thus if gα  is positive 
even in the ‘polarity’ case, it will certainly be so in the ‘median voter’ one. 
 
B. Global optima 
 
To go from local to global optima, we need to incorporate the fall in g (Proposition 1) as 
α crosses the critical threshold of 
* α . Putting this fact together with (13) and (16) gives 
us Figure 5, which depicts the three possible cases (the fourth one, a downward slope 
below and an upward one above α *, has just been ruled out in Proposition 2.) There is, 
however, one detail in Figure 5 that is not explicitly given by (13) and (16); namely that 
() () A g C g >  in Figure (5a) but  () () C g A g >  in Figure (5b). But this must always be the 
case, since the condition for  () () A g C g >  turns out to be identical to the condition for 
being in Figure (5a) rather than Figure (5b) in the first place.
9 
 
Let us now interpret and compare the situations in Figures (5a), (5b) and (5c). Recall that 
for levels of α below 
* α  political capital is less important in terms of generating votes 
and parties locate at the centre (the median voter outcome.) For levels of α greater than 
* α , political capital is sufficiently important in the vote production function to give the 
polarity outcome. 
 
In Figure (5a), activists are more responsive to better government than voters are, and 
hence more effective at keeping the government up to the mark. As they become more 
important to the government, therefore, government improves – but with an interruption   24
as α crosses 
* α . At this point government spending no longer brings in activists on the 
extreme left (right) as well as centrist ones – parties become polarized and the extremists 
would be helping them regardless of any improvement in the quality of government. This 
one-off drop in the electoral rewards from pleasing activists produces a one-off drop in 
public spending. 
 
In Figure (5c) political capital is relatively insensitive to good government and it is 
potential voters who are most swayed by the government giving up rents. Government, 
therefore, improves with the reward to the government from pleasing potential voters (as 
α falls). If  () g ' β  is low, then anything is better than  1 = α , where the government faces a 
set of voters it has no incentive to please and a set of activists who give it little thanks 
when it does. As α rises, government spending falls, exacerbated by the one-off drop as α 
crosses 
* α . 
 
Figure (5b) is the intermediate case. When α is high, only the centre activists respond to 
better government (the extremists are helping it anyway). This is sufficient for the 
situation to resemble Figure (5c). But when the radicals’ response kicks in as α falls 
through 
* α α = , this not only produces the standard jump in g, but also gives the 
government enough “buyable” activists for the balance of incentive to change, tipping us 
into the world of Figure (5a). Further reductions in α are now undesirable; the ideal is to 
be just to the left of 
* α . 
   25
As for policy implications, in case (5c), anything which makes a party’s vote less 
dependent on effective organization is unambiguously good for welfare. In (5a),  0 = α  
(organization irrelevant) is the worst outcome. However, nothing, and certainly not 
compulsory voting, will make party workers completely superfluous. Making voting 
compulsory does not get everyone to vote, as a look at Australia will show. There is still 
a role for suasion, encouragement, and knocking up one hour before the polls close. 
 
This raises the possibility that α might be ‘fine-tuned’ by varying the penalties for not 
voting ( 01 . 0 = α  with executions, 0.05 with jail, 
2 1 . 0 F F + −  where F is the size of the 
fine?) In that case, compulsory voting could conceivably be an improvement even in case 
(5a), provided that α is initially greater than 
* α . (Incompletely successful compulsion 
also raises the theoretical possibility that compulsory voting might make activists more 
important: suppose there were a great many people who could be persuaded to vote by 
heavy fines and heavy canvassing, but only in combination.) 
 
In case (5b), moving to  0 = α  is always an improvement when 
* α α >  and always bad 
when 
* α α < . Compulsory voting, even assuming it does not lead to  0 = α , will be an 
improvement if it has the effect of making α cross the 
* α  boundary. 
 
Our empirical work suggests a value of α of about 2/3. The fact that that parties remain 
ideologically distinct suggests this is high enough for democracies to end up between 
points C and D regardless of the sensitivity of political capital to good governance. A 
reduction in α of the right size would thus improve government even in case (5a), and all   26
such reductions do so in cases (5b) and (5c). Assuming compulsory voting does reduce 
the role of capital (to the extent people now go and vote anyway), it would raise 
economic welfare in both these cases. The same could be said for on-line voting, or 
anything which either reduces the cost of voting or raises the cost of not voting. 
 
Finally, does this theory carry any implications for State funding of political parties? So 
far as an unearned income makes volunteers and private finance less essential to a party 
machine, it too would reduce the value of α, with the consequences discussed above. The 
issue is a complicated one, however, so far as (1) some electioneering is probably done 
better by enthusiastic amateurs even if you can afford professionals, (2) your ideology 
might still affect your ability to attract staff, even if they are paid (3) the distinction 
between party income and governmental rent would blur, leading to the presence of 




In this paper we propose a vote production function that encapsulates the importance of 
elements like a strong membership and campaign funding for political parties. It is 
because of such political capital that parties maintain ideological distance from each 
other. There is reasonable empirical support for the vote production function and in 
particular we show that ideology affects voting behavior once political capital variables, 
as proxied by membership and campaign expenditure, are accounted for. 
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The fact that parties don’t converge in the centre implies that political capital is more 
heavily concentrated towards the ideological extremes than is the potential vote. Our 
estimate of α = 2/3, plus the failure of parties to converge, implies c>1 i.e. political 
capital is quite steeply banked towards the two ideological fringes. 
 
Finally, you get the best government when the government can buy the largest number of 
additional votes by improving its performance and reducing its rent-seeking or wasteful 
activities. So the question is: will sidelining the party organizations make this electoral 
bonus larger or smaller? The answer depends whether the activists are more or less 
responsive to better government than the voters. If they are less responsive, then anything 
which makes them less important – including compulsory voting – will make the total 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 Country specific time trends are composed of an interaction of a time trend and country 
dummies. These are included because turnout has trended downwards for most countries, 
but to different degrees – see Wattenberg (2002). Of course, equation (1) relates to the 
relative vote, so if turnout for both parties falls equiproportionately then such time trends 
may not be necessary, although we include them to account for varying falls in turnout 
across the ideological spectrum. The regression analysis also included time effects 
common to all countries but these were insignificant in all cases. 
2 At first sight omission seems a drastic course of action, but it only deprives us of 7 
observations. 
3 Won’t the weight party Y attaches to its re-election depend partly on the rents it then 
hopes to get? And aren’t these likely to be related to the current ones? Putting in an 
interactive term along these lines immensely complicates the mathematics without 
yielding essentially different conclusions. We therefore assume here that politicians serve 
only one term of office and do not care what rents their successors get. However, whether 
they retire before or just after the election, they care about winning it for their party. 
4 Remember that equation (6) was derived explicitly on the basis that y ≥ z+ β(g). The 
condition we have derived for the sign of  y Y U ) (  thus applies only when y exceeds this 
lower limit. 
5 At first sight the sign of  α g  seems to depend here on the absolute value of  () g ' β  rather 
than its relation to  () g f ' . This would be hard to understand if true. But in fact it is the 
relation of  () g ' β  to  () g f '  which counts here, as one would expect. Each value of  () g ' β    29
                                                                                                                                                 
implies a particular equilibrium value of  () g f ' , as equation (12) shows. The relation of 
() g ' β  to  () g f '  is thus implicit in (13), which could equally well have featured  () g f ' a s  
the ostensible key variable and omitted  () g ' β . 
6 Complications would arise if  () g ' β  exceeded 
* ' β  over some of the range 
* α α <  but 
not all of it. Fortunately this can’t happen: if  () ()
* ' ' β β < > g  at 
* α α = , then (13) 
() 0 < > α g , and hence  () [] () 0 ' > < α β g . Furthermore  () [] () 0 < > α β g  and hence from the 
RHS of (13) [ ] () 0 '
* < > α β . Hence any excess (deficiency) of  () g ' β  over 
* ' β  at 
* α α =  
will become steadily more pronounced as α moves towards zero. 
7 Like (13), and for the same reasons, (16) will either always hold or never hold as α  
varies within the relevant range (see previous footnote.) 
8 i.e. A fall in  () g ' β  caused by a fall in the responsiveness of  () g β  to g, not by a rise in g 
(which would also reduce  () g f , making the effect on  α g  ambiguous.) 
9 Let subscripts 1 and 3 denote values of variables at point A and point C respectively. 
Then, from (12), (15) and (16)  
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c . 
Hence  () () C g f A g f ' ' > , i.e.  () () A g C g > , iff  () ()
* *
3 ' ' β β > g , the necessary and 
sufficient condition for being in Fig. (5a) rather than Fig. (5b).   30
DATA APPENDIX 
 
The analysis focuses on general elections across countries and through time. Data on 
ideology and membership are available at the national level and vary considerably 
through time and across countries. We placed no restrictions on the selection of data so as 
to obtain the largest data set possible. The full data set is available on request. 
 
Data on the percentage vote for left-wing and right-wing parties were obtained from 
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. For our ideology measure we used the ‘vanilla’ 
measure constructed by Gabel and Huber (2000), which was their preferred measure 
using alternative aggregation methods using manifestos data. These data assign a value 
between 0 (extreme left) and 10 (extreme right) for all major political parties in Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the UK for general elections between 
1950 and 1992. These data were divided by 10 to obtain values of x and y between 0 and 
1. 
 
Susan Scarrow provided us with aggregate membership data of individual parties and 
inevitably this has gaps (see Scarrow, 2000, and Webb, Farrell and Holliday, 2002), 
especially as the relative measure used in the regressions requires concurrent data for 
both parties, but nonetheless is the most comprehensive set of data feasible. The data set 
analyzed in tables 1 and 2 is summarized in table A1. 
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TABLE A1. MEMBERSHIP DATA 
Country Elections  Number 
of obs. 
Australia  1966, 1972, 1990  3 
Austria  1953, 1956, 1959, 1962, 1966, 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 
1983, 1986, 1991 
12 
Belgium  1961, 1965, 1968, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987  9 
Canada  1974, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1988  5 
Denmark  1960, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 
1981, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1990 
14 
France  1958, 1962 ,1967, 1968, 1981, 1988  6 
Germany  1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990  10 
Ireland 1987,  1989  2 
Italy  1968, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992  7 
Japan  1960, 1979, 1980  3 
The Netherlands  1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989  10 
New Zealand  1954, 1960, 1972, 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987  8 
Norway  1961, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989  7 





1964, 1966, 1970, 1974 (both), 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992  9 
Total   116 
 
Data on campaign expenditure is provided by Katz and Mair (1992). In some countries 
parties are not obliged to report their finances, and this limits the data-set further. Table 
A2 summarizes the data-set analyzed in table 3, for which both campaign expenditure 
and membership data were available.  
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TABLE A2. ELECTIONS WHERE BOTH MEMBERSHIP AND CAMPAIGN 
EXPENDITURE DATA WERE AVAILABLE 
Country Elections  Number  of 
observations 
Austria  1959, 1962, 1966, 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 
1986, 1991 
10 
Ireland 1987  1 
Italy  1976, 1979, 1983, 1987  4 
The Netherlands  1967, 1971, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989  7 
Norway  1977, 1981, 1985, 1989  4 
Sweden  1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988  7 
United 
Kingdom 
1964, 1966, 1970, 1974 (both), 1979, 1983, 1987  8 
Total   41 
 
In most countries it is straightforward to identify the principle left- and right-wing parties. 
When there is more than one party in a coalition then the membership data is aggregated 
and the ideology data is an average of the party-specific ideology scores with weights 
according to vote shares obtained in the election. In all countries there are third parties 
whose own policy platforms may affect the vote shares of the protagonists considered 
here. However, the key arguments remain, that the ideological location and relative 
political capital of the two principle ideologically aligned parties will affect vote shares. 
Table A3 details the parties used in the analysis. 
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TABLE A3. POLITICAL PARTIES 
Country Left-wing  Right-wing 
Australia  ALP (Labour)  Liberal & Country Parties 
Austria  SPO (Socialists)  OVP (People’s Party) 
Belgium  PSB-BSP (Socialists)  PLP-PVV (Liberals) 
Canada Liberals  Progressive  Conservatives 
Denmark  Social Democrats  Conservatives & Liberal Democrats 
France Socialists  Gaullists 
Germany  Social Democrats  Christian Democrats 
Ireland  Labour  Fianna Fail & Fine Gael 
Italy  PCI (Communists) + 
PSI (Socialists) 
Christian Democrats, PLI (Liberals), MSI (neo-
fascists) 
Japan  JSP (Socialists)  LDP (Liberals) 
The Netherlands  PvDA (Labour)  VVD (Freedom and Democracy) 
New Zealand  Labour  National 
Norway  DNA (Labour)  Centre, Christian Peoples, Conservatives, Liberals 
Sweden SAP  (Social 
Democrats) 
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) 075 . 0 (
212 . 0 log
) 030 . 0 (
179 . 0 log  
Number of Observations  109 
2 R   0.41 
Heteroscedasticity omissions  Canada, Ireland 
Cameron + Trivedi Heteroscedasticity test (p-value)  0.004 
RESET test (p-value)  0.26 
H0:  2 1 1 b b − =  (p-value)  0.000 
 
TABLE 2. ERRORS IN VARIABLES REGRESSION OF VOTE PRODUCTION 

































) 034 . 0 (
365 . 0 log
) 039 . 0 (
603 . 0 log  
Number of Observations  109 
2 R   0.89 
Heteroscedasticity Omissions  Canada, Ireland 
p-value of model hypothesis  0.576 
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TABLE 3. ESTIMATION OF THE VOTE PRODUCTION FUNCTION USING 
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) 066 . 0 (
331 . 0 log
) 068 . 0 (
480 . 0 log
068 . 0
189 . 0 
Number of observations  41 
2 R   0.68 
Heteroscedasticity Omissions  None 
RESET test (p-value)  0.001 
Cameron + Trivedi test for Heteroscedasticity 
(p-value) 
0.079 
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    x    1    ideology (θ) 
Given policy platforms, x and y, members of the electorate to the left 
(right) of the critical point, 
2
y x +
 are potential voters for the left- (right-) 
wing party.   37









































Figure 2 shows the raw Gabel and Huber ideology time-series data for the left- and right- 
wing parties in the UK and France.   38
FIGURE 3. LEFT-WING MAJORITY VS RELATIVE 
IDEOLOGICAL LOCATION













































log  with left and right parties defined in the 
appendix. The relative ideological position, or location variable as we define it in the text, 











log  where x and y are constructed using the Gabel and Huber 



















































         0   z y − 2     z y − 1      2 y            1 y       z y + 2      z y + 1    0.5 
          i d e o l o g y   ( θ) 
A party’s political capital depends on its ideological location. Consider for example two
policy platforms y1 and y2. In the first case party Y’s political capital consists of the area 
under the curve bounded by  z y − 1  on the left and  z y + 1 on the right. In the second case 
party Y’s political capital consists of the area under the curve bounded by  z y − 2 on the 
left and  z y + 2  on the right. When parties move to the extremes (or at least no further 















































FIGURE 5. HOW PUBLIC SPENDING RESPONDS TO THE IMPORTANCE 
OF POLITICAL CAPITAL IN THE VOTE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
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